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DATA AND PERSPECTIVES 
Long-Term Population 
Decline in Europe: The 
Relative Importance of 
Tempo Effects and 
Generational Length 
JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN 
WOLFGANG LUTZ 
SERGEI SCHERBOV 
IT HAS RECENTLY been suggested that ending the increase in the average age 
of childbearing in Europe would have a substantial effect on population 
dynamics by slowing population decline and aging. On the other hand, stable 
population theory suggests that under conditions of subreplacement fertil-
ity, longer generation length would imply slower shrinking, and thus pro-
duce a larger population in the long run. This note compares the relative 
importance of these two effects analytically and with actual data from the 
European Union. 
In a recent contribution to the Policy Forum of Science entitled "Europe's 
population at a turning point," Lutz, O'Neill, and Scherbov (2003) showed 
that Europe has just entered a period of negative population momentum-
a tendency to decline in response to an old age structure, even if fertility 
were to instantly increase to replacement level. They tried to quantify the 
effect of continued increases in the mean age of childbearing (the so-called 
tempo effect) on the absolute number of births and future population dy-
namics in the 15-country European Union. They used as a baseline a sce-
nario in which the tempo effect ends instantly-that is, the mean age of 
childbearing remains constant-and, as a result, the period total fertility 
rate (TFR) increases from 1.5 to 1.8. This baseline was compared to a con-
tinuation of the tempo effect for 10, 20, 30, or 40 more years, which would 
keep the TFR lower by 0.3 over those periods. 
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Lutz et al. found that the effects on population dynamics of continued 
low period fertility depressed by a continued increase in the mean age of 
childbearing are substantial. One method of calculation attributed 45 per-
cent of future population decline to a continuation of the tempo effect until 
2020. The consequences of continued increase in the mean age of birth on 
future population aging in the EU are also large. Seen from the perspective 
of the working-age population, defined as ages 15 to 64, continued delay of 
10 to 40 years would imply that, ceteris paribus, an additional 500 million 
to 1,500 million person-years of working-age persons would be needed to 
support the elderly population over the rest of the century, as compared 
with the no-delay scenario. 
The demographic consequences of later childbearing have political im-
plications. While governments in Europe are increasingly concerned about 
possible negative consequences of current low birth rates, there is also pro-
nounced public resistance to any direct government interventions in the 
choice of one's family size, which is considered a private matter. In this 
context, policies that aim to influence the timing of births rather than fam-
ily size might be more acceptable. Health benefits might provide an addi-
tional rationale for such policies, given that a continued delay in childbear-
ing has led not only to burgeoning numbers of infertility treatments but 
also to increasing medical concerns about health risks for mothers and chil-
dren associated with late pregnancies. 
The conclusion of Lutz, O'Neill, and Scherbov that halting the trend 
toward higher mean ages of childbearing would significantly moderate popu-
lation aging and decline of population size in Europe (over the rest of this 
century}, however, seems to be in conflict with one of the implications of 
stable population theory.1 In a stable population with fertility below replace-
ment level, a higher mean age of childbearing means a slower shrinking; a 
lower mean age of childbearing accelerates the process of shrinking through 
a faster succession of generations. 
One would expect that the consequences of the tempo effect are more 
pronounced in the near future while those of a changing mean length of 
generation would only show up in the longer run. But this intuitive assess-
ment does not make precise the consequences of possible policies aimed at 
influencing the mean age of childbearing. In this note, we quantify the ef-
fect on population size and aging of changing fertility timing, first through 
an analytical examination of this issue and then using numerical simula-
tions applied to the current demographic situation of the European Union. 
An analytical answer 
Changes in the mean age of childbearing can influence the number of births 
through several distinct pathways. First, the tempo effect of advancing or 
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postponing births has an immediate effect on the number of births in a cal-
endar period (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Second, as suggested above, 
the generation-length effect will have consequences for the long-term popu-
lation growth rate. Finally, changes in the timing of childbearing may in-
fluence the total fertility achieved by cohorts over their lifetime, with couples 
who start earlier having more children than couples who start late. This 
change in cohort fertility that accompanies changes in timing is known as 
the tempo-quantum interaction effect. 
A model taking into account these three factors considers the number 
of births B*(t) at some future time t that result from a change in the mean 
age of childbearing relative to the number of births B(t) that would have 
occurred had timing remained constant. Assuming the three factors are in-
dependent, then for t long after fertility timing stops changing, 
B*(t) 
-- =tempo effect x generation-length effect (t) x quantum effect (t), 
B(t) 
where the quantum effect(!) stands for the tempo-quantum interaction ef-
fect at time t. Note that the tempo effect is a one-time effect, whereas the 
generation-length and tempo-quantum interaction effects persist because 
they influence the underlying intrinsic rate of growth. In the case of a grow-
ing population, increasing the mean age of childbearing will depress all three 
factors. However, in the case of a shrinking population, later childbearing 
will depress future births through the tempo and tempo-quantum interac-
tion effects, but inflate future births via the generation-length effect. Our 
goal is to explore which of these offsetting effects dominates, and when. 
The relative magnitude of each of these three effects can be estimated 
fairly easily. For illustration, we consider the case of contemporary west-
ern Europe, where the cohort net reproduction rate (NRR) is roughly 0.9 
and we take women's mean age of childbearing as 29 years. We investigate 
the consequences of a gradual increase in the mean age of childbearing to 
33 years. 
In the short term, higher ages of childbearing will reduce the number 
of births via the tempo effect. Even after the postponement of fertility comes 
to an end, the birth stream will continue to be smaller than it otherwise 
would have been, because the short-term decline in births will echo into 
subsequent generations. Goldstein and Schlag ( 1999) found that the long-
term effect will be inversely proportional to the change in the mean age of 
childbearing.2 Specifically, an increase in the mean childbearing age from 
29 to 33 years will reduce the long-term number of births by a factor of 
1 - 29/33, or about 12 percent, relative to what would have occurred had 
the childbearing timing remained constant. 
The generation-length effect is also quantifiable. From stable population 
theory, the intrinsic growth rate is approximately log(NRR) I µ, where the 
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mean age of childbearing µ is used as an estimate of the mean length of a 
generation in the stable population. Taking derivatives with respect to µgives 
-log(NRR)/ µ 2• Continuing our numerical example, an increase of one year in 
mean age will slow the rate of population decline by about -log(.9)/292 = 
12/100,000. A four-year increase slows the rate of decline from-0.36 percent 
to -0.32 percent. This is quite a small effect, less than I/20th of one percent. 
We can use these estimates of the tempo effect and generation length 
to ask how long it will take the generation-length effect, which influences 
the exponential growth rate over time, to overwhelm the one-time long-
term effect of tempo. In our example, it will take about 250 years for the 
I/20th of one percent change in the annual growth rate to offset the 12 
percent change in the birth stream. For the next two or three centuries, 
however, the tempo effect will dominate. 
Finally, we can consider the behavioral and biological effect of changes 
in women's timing on the total number of children born over women's life-
time. This is a difficult quantity to estimate, since changes in timing have also 
been accompanied by changes in fertility preferences. However, Kohler et al. 
(2001) have found that an increase of one year in the mean age of birth 
lowers cohort fertility by about 3 percent. Although such estimates are nec-
essarily imprecise, their magnitude suggests that the total fertility effect will 
far outweigh any generation-length effect. In our example, increasing the 
mean age of childbearing from 29 to 33 years would reduce the NRR from 
0.9 to about 0.9*(0.97)4 = 0.80. Such a change in lifetime fertility would nearly 
double the rate of population decline from -0.36 percent to -0.68 percent, 
even after taking into account the moderating effect of longer generation 
length. 
The analytical results suggest that the growth effects of changing gen-
eration length will be of minor importance. It will take several centuries for 
growth effects to reverse the initial tempo effect on births. Furthermore, 
the effect on growth rates is likely to be more than offset by changes in life-
time fertility. 
It is possible to perform more exact analytical calculations by taking into 
account the full detail of the starting age structure. However, the complexi-
ties of such calculations make it convenient to turn to simulation to assess 
the effect of changes in fertility timing on population sizes in Europe. An 
added benefit of the simulations is that they allow one to see transient effects 
resulting from shifts in fertility rates in addition to the long-term impacts. 
They also allow us to look at changes in population age structure over time. 
A numerical answer through simulation 
The calculations presented below refer to the population of the European 
Union with its 15 member states as of 2003. They use the same baseline 
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data in terms of the initial age distribution and fertility and mortality condi-
tions as in the calculations by Lutz, O'Neill and Scherbov (2003) discussed 
above. As in that paper, we also consider a tempo effect of 0.3 in terms of 
TFR, which corresponds to an increase in the mean age of childbearing of 
0.2 years per year or 2.0 years per decade starting with a mean age of 29 
years in 2000 (Bongaarts 2002). Alternative calculations were performed 
for tempo effects lasting 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40 years. The figures below show 
only the cases of zero and 20 years of tempo effects, which clearly illustrate 
the main points. 
The figures give three distinct scenarios: 
Scenario 1 shows the case of an immediate end to the factor causing 
the tempo effect, that is, no further changes in the mean age of childbear-
ing are assumed, hence period TFR is taken as constant at 1.8. 
Scenario 2 shows the case in which the current tempo effect is as-
sumed to continue for 20 more years without having an effect on total co-
hort fertility (i.e., no interactions). The period TFR is at 1.5 until 2020 when 
it increases to 1.8. In this case the curve of age-specific fertility rates is sim-
ply moved to the right by two years per decade. This also implies that birth 
rates above age 40 would increase considerably, which does not seem very 
realistic unless medically assisted conception becomes far more common 
than at present. 
Scenario 3 assumes a continuation of the tempo effect as in Scenario 
2, but it also assumes that not all postponed births will be recuperated, hence 
there is a negative effect (tempo-quantum interaction) on total fertility. In 
this scenario we apply the simple method of proportionally reducing the 
age-specific fertility rates by 3 percent (the Kohler et al. estimate discussed 
above) for each year the age profile is shifted to the right, that is, to higher 
ages of childbearing. 
We also applied more complex approaches that consider the nonlin-
earity of the tempo-quantum interaction attributable to the fact that at 
higher ages declining fecundability results in a greater reduction of fertility 
as women more closely approach a biological limit. In other words, an in-
crease in the mean age of childbearing from 25 to 26 years should have a 
lower effect on the quantum than a shift from 31 to 32. Since different 
approaches we applied also resulted in fertility reductions of around 3 per-
cent per year for a shift starting around the current European mean age of 
29 years, we decided to use the simpler linear assumption for the illustra-
tive calculations in this note. 
We emphasize that the three scenarios have been defined in order to 
analyze specific features of population dynamics and should not be mis-
taken for plausible or even likely future paths. The assumptions of a closed 
population with no further mortality changes and constant fertility after 
2021 are certainly not plausible assumptions for the future of Europe, but 
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they are useful for illustrating some important points. The projections were 
run for single-year age groups in single-year time steps. 
Figure I gives the total population size of the current EDI 5 for these 
three scenarios over the next four centuries. Such a long time horizon is 
necessary in order to appropriately assess the long-term impacts of the dif-
ferent effects and compare them to the analytical reasoning given above. 
The figure clearly shows that over the first two centuries the positive effect 
of stopping the delay in childbearing (Scenario I) clearly outweighs the ef-
fect of a longer mean length of generation in the case of 20 years of further 
delay (Scenario 2). Only during the twenty-third century does the genera-
tion-length effect catch up and only after 2300 does it dominate (in the 
case of no tempo-quantum interaction), but the difference between the two 
lines is much smaller than during the twenty-first century. Scenario 3, as-
suming a depressing effect of a higher mean age of childbearing on total 
fertility, lies far below the two other curves. This clearly confirms the view 
expressed in the analytical section that the presence of such a depressing 
tempo-quantum interaction effect completely dominates the picture, and 
the long-term positive effect of a longer generation becomes marginal. 
Figure 2 gives the trends in old-age dependency ratios (65+/15-64) 
generated by the same three scenarios. It extends only to 2150 because the 
stabilization of age structure under constant fertility and mortality condi-
FIGURE I Total population size of EU15 under three childbearing 
scenarios over four centuries 
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FIGURE 2 Old-age dependency ratio of EU15 under three childbearing 
scenarios over one and a half centuries 
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tions makes the picture less interesting in the longer run. This figure clearly 
confirms that with respect to population aging the tempo effect dominates 
the effect of longer generation length. A striking result is that for about half 
of the twenty-first century (from 2025 to 2075), the delay scenario (Sce-
nario 2) has significantly higher dependency ratios than the no-delay sce-
nario (Scenario 1 ), implying larger pension burdens for an extended period 
preceding the eventual convergence of the dependency ratios. 
The comparison of Figures 1 and 2 also illustrates an important feature 
of stable population dynamics that is often forgotten by commentators on 
long-term population and environment trends. Because projections show that 
over the coming decades population aging in Europe will go hand in hand 
with population decline (unless large-scale immigration stops the decline), 
people unfamiliar with stable population theory tend to see these two trends 
as inseparable twins. On the global level one often hears the view that popu-
lation aging (in the sense of an ongoing process toward an older and older 
population) is the price paid for limiting population growth (after an initial 
beneficial "demographic bonus") . But our long-term scenarios serve as a re-
minder that this is only true during a transitory period of some 80 years. 
After that, we could have a situation of further declining population size-
the dream of many ecologists-without having to pay the price of further 
aging, as distinct from an admittedly rather aged population. As Figure 2 shows, 
constant fertility even at low levels will result in a peak of the old age de-
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pendency burden around 2040 in Europe, still a consequence of the baby 
boom, to be followed by a moderate decline before stabilizing. This insight is 
clearly relevant for global climate change models that do have a time horizon 
of centuries, that see population size as a key driver of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and that consider population aging an obstacle to societies' capacities 
to adapt to unavoidable climate change. 
Conclusions 
In this short note we have demonstrated analytically and through a set of 
long-term population scenarios that a halt to the current tempo effect in 
Europe would have significant long-term moderating effects on population 
decline and aging. The objection that a continued postponement of child-
bearing also increases the generation length and therefore, under subre-
placement fertility conditions, would also lead to slower population decline 
is theoretically correct but empirically unimportant for the next two centu-
ries. Furthermore, it is likely that later childbearing will itself reduce total 
cohort fertility. Taking this effect into account overwhelms any effect of 
generation length. 
We did not address the difficult question of what kinds of policy inter-
vention might end further delays in childbearing or even decrease the mean 
age of childbearing over the coming decades. These issues will need further 
research and discussion. But this note prepares the demographic ground-
work for such a discussion in demonstrating unambiguously that an end to 
further postponement of childbearing does have significant positive effects 
both on population size and on reducing the burden of population aging 
over the coming decades and in the long term. These benefits would be also 
enjoyed for a fairly long period into the future. 
Notes 
The order of authorship is alphabetical. 
1 We thank Paul Demeny for bringing this 
point to our attention at the 2003 Annual 
Meeting of the Population Association of 
America. In the context of a discussion of 
European population trends he writes: 
In the short and medium term, transition 
toward a lower mean generational length 
would be growth-promoting. But if fertil-
ity remains below replacement, the nega-
tive intrinsic growth rate would deplete the 
population mote speedily, since the suc-
ceeding smaller and smaller generations 
would replace one another more quickly. 
A higher generational length would, in the 
long run, stretch out the decline somewhat, 
moderating its annual tempo . (Demeny 
2003 : 3) 
2 Goldstein and Schlag ( 1999) give the 
result for stationary populations . A full proof 
of the result for populations with non-zero 
growth rates is given in #Proof accompany-
ing 'longer life and population growth,'" avail-
able at «http://opr.princeton.edu/-josh/ 
stretchproof.pdf». The proof assumes that the 
intrinsic growth rate associated with cohort 
net fertility is constant. Standard results from 
renewal theory can also be used. 
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